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Robin Evans-Jones, UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT VOLUME 2: ENRICHMENT 
ACQUIRED IN ANY OTHER MANNER  
 
Edinburgh: W Green. 2013.  xxv  + 201 pp.  ISBN 978 0 414 0849 5.  £150. 
 
With this book Robin Evans-Jones completes a two-volume project the first part of which 
appeared in 2003.  While the claim that “this book is the first major systematic treatment of 
the Scottish law of unjustified enrichment” (para 1.01) overlooks the late Bill Stewart’s 
Restitution (1992, with supplement 1995), it is probably fair to say that the latter work was 
premature and overly enthusiastic about the structure proposed for Scots as for English law 
by the also now sadly late Peter Birks in the mid-1980s.  The model espoused instead by 
Professor Evans-Jones in his two volumes is that of German enrichment law.  It, as shown by 
the scholarship of Evans-Jones himself and a number of others, most notably Professor Niall 
Whitty, provides a much better “fit” for and explanation of the Scottish material on the 
subject; while Birks himself famously renounced his initial approach in favour of one much 
closer to that found in Germany.  In Scotland today, as Evans-Jones further remarks, it is 
“universally agreed” amongst legal writers that this is “the best way in which the subject 
should now be organised” (para 1.01); “[a] consensus has emerged that the causes of action 
of the law of unjustified enrichment as a whole are usefully grouped according to the manner 
in which the enrichment was acquired” (para 1.52).   Thus an approach founded on the 
manner of enrichment (whether by way of deliberate transfer to or unauthorised imposition 
upon the enriched party, or by that party’s interference with the rights of the other), plus the 
absence of a legally valid basis for retention of the enrichment by the defender (such as 
contract or gift), is to be seen in Martin Hogg’s Obligations, the relevant chapter of the last 
two editions of Gloag & Henderson, and this reviewer’s student introduction to the subject 
(which has so far appeared in four successive incarnations between 2003 and 2013).  It will 
also be the scheme used in Niall Whitty’s forthcoming exposition in a Stair Memorial 
Encyclopaedia reissue.   
 
 This consensus in the literature is not yet, however, reflected in the decisions of the 
courts, even though it was indeed the judges who in the 1990s overthrew the old world of the 
“three Rs” – repetition, restitution and recompense – in the three great cases of Morgan 
Guaranty Trust Co of New York v Lothian Regional Council 1995 SC 151, Shilliday v Smith 
1998 SC 725 and Dollar Land (Cumbernauld) Ltd v CIN Properties Ltd 1998 SC (HL) 90.  
Relatively few enrichment cases since then have found their way to the upper levels of the 
Scottish court system, so the lack of authoritative judicial endorsement of the academic 
position is perhaps not surprising; but it makes life difficult for first instance judges and those 
arguing the law before them.  It is apparent from now numerous examples, some of which 
Evans-Jones discusses in his opening chapter, that the struggle to come to grips with the law 
has often not got very far beyond the general propositions that enrichments are unjustified 
and fall to be reversed unless supported by a legal basis, and that this is an area of law 
informed by equity.  The result is, as pointed out elsewhere, that  
 
we face the danger identified by the great American comparatist John P Dawson in his 
famous book Unjust Enrichment (1952), that judges will either “jump off the dock” (p 
8) or “rocket up into the stratosphere” (even if in the latter scenario they first “fasten 
their seat belts”) (p 12).  This may have disastrous results for the predictability and 
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certainty of the law, with recovery denied in cases where it should have been allowed, 
or allowed where it should have been denied.
1
 
 
 The key to a better understanding, as Evans-Jones re-argues forcefully in the first two 
chapters of the present volume, lies in probing further than was possible in the case itself, 
Lord President Rodger’s comment in Shilliday: 
 
As the law has developed, it has identified various situations where persons are to be 
regarded as having been unjustly enriched at another’s expense and where the other 
person may accordingly seek to have the enrichment reversed.  The authorities show 
that some of these situations fall into recognisable groups or categories.
2
 
 
Shilliday was a case about a conferral of an enrichment upon the defender by the pursuer for 
a purpose that failed, conferral or voluntary transfer from one party to another being one of 
the major groups or categories of enrichment which is itself divided into further groups 
corresponding broadly with the condictiones of Roman law – indebiti, causa data causa non 
secuta, ob turpem causam, ob causam finitam, and so on.  This was also in essence the field 
covered by the actions of repetition and restitution in the world of the three Rs, and the 
subject-matter of Evans-Jones’ first volume.  In Shilliday Lord Rodger did not have to go on 
to discuss the third R, recompense; in broad terms once again, this is the area which, for those 
whose understanding of the subject first developed under and is still shaped by the old 
currency, is now tackled in this second volume. 
 
 “Recompense” was never a very satisfactory way of categorising the cases that were 
grouped under that rather opaque heading.  Evans-Jones notes that, while the category came 
to be defined by certain “marks or notes” (Lord Dunedin’s phrase in Edinburgh and District 
Tramways Co v Courtenay 1909 SC 99 at 105), the random-ness with which they were 
developed through the cases prevented them from working as an overall analytical or even 
usefully descriptive tool, in part because some (enrichment of one by another without 
intention to donate) were too wide, while others (requirements of the pursuer’s loss while not 
acting for its own benefit, error, and the non-existence of another remedy) did not apply in all 
cases.  German law’s method of grouping enrichment cases outside conferral/transfer is to be 
preferred.  First there are the cases of interference with another’s property rights without a 
legal ground for doing so; next come the cases where an unauthorised benefit is in good faith 
imposed upon another; and finally there are the cases of payment of another’s debt or 
performance of another’s duty.  The great attraction of these factually described groupings is 
well caught by Evans-Jones’ quotation (at para 2.03) of James Gordley’s summary of the 
thinking of one of their German progenitors, Ernst von Caemmerer: 
 
When it is a question of applying a general clause that is framed in so broad and 
general a way as the maxim of “unjust enrichment” one cannot use “abstract and 
general criteria of application”.  A jurist, “like a judge in a system of case law”, must 
identify “groups of cases and types of claims”.  To do so is not merely the first step in 
the analysis.  It is the only way that the principle can be made concrete. 
 
 Evans-Jones also demonstrates how these fact-based categories themselves developed 
from even more specific paradigm cases: the interference category from the remedies 
                                                 
1
 Hector MacQueen, Unjustified Enrichment Law Basics (3rd edn, 2013), Preface.  
2
 Shilliday v Smith 1998 SC 725, at 727.  Evans-Jones italicises the second sentence when he quotes this dictum 
(para 1.51).  
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provided originally in Roman property law to the person deprived of ownership by a 
specificator who had put the object of property beyond vindication; imposition from the 
claim of the good faith builder on another’s land that also existed in Roman law; and payment 
of another’s debt from the Roman law institution of negotiorum gestio.  The development 
illustrates the slow movement of the law from the particular to the more general, or, as 
Evans-Jones would have it, from the foundational cases to those that, through the filter 
provided by the general principle (which was of course also identified in Roman law, by the 
classical jurist Pomponius in the second century CE), are analogous to those previously 
identified. 
 
 The biggest difficulty with the new approach is of course that the main source 
material – the decisions of the courts and the authoritative writings from Stair on – is by and 
large not couched directly in the terms now being advocated.  There is accordingly a job to be 
done in showing how the cases in particular may be made to fit the scheme without distorting 
them.  A notable feature of the central chapters of Evans-Jones’ treatise is the detailed 
analysis of various decisions long recognised as leading ones in the field, showing where they 
may be placed in the new map of the law.  This ought to help pleaders in court who 
understandably have greater comfort dealing with the authority provided by precedent 
compared to teasing out the implications of principle for the particular set of facts before 
them.  From time to time help is sought in comparative law: mostly South African texts and 
decisions, and only very occasionally English law, since the latter is by and large quite 
different from Scots law in its approach and its results in both interference and imposition 
cases.  There is however little need to worry about Roman law concepts or Latin terminology 
here, by comparison with the first volume’s detailed discussion of the condictiones as the 
continuing basis of Scots law in conferral/transfer cases post-Shilliday.   
 
 The consensus of the Scottish legal writers on basic structure does not necessarily 
extend to points of detail within that structure.  In accordance with articles published en route 
to this volume, Evans-Jones argues that cases usually assigned to the imposition category, 
such as Newton v Newton 1925 SC 715, should instead be treated as instances of 
conferral/transfer, usually under the sub-heads of indebiti and causa data causa non secuta 
(paras 5.07-5.18).   This is generally persuasive.  But his separation out from the imposition 
category of the payment or performance of another’s obligation rests on the unconvincing 
grounds that the third party’s action does not create any new burden for the defender but 
merely puts a new creditor in place, and that in fact the debtor often consents to the third 
party’s action (para 2.24).  It is surely doubtful, however, that any claim is enrichment-based 
if the debtor has consented to the third party’s action, while in the absence of consent a new 
creditor in a new obligation is surely “imposed” upon the debtor.  Evans-Jones also adopts a 
relatively narrow approach to the interference category, focusing mainly on the enriched 
party’s use of another person’s property rights as an action which is that other party’s 
exclusive preserve in law.  While the unauthorised taking of a service (for example, by a 
stowaway on a ship or aircraft) may fall within the scope of interference (thus making the 
stowaway liable to pay for the transportation he or she receives), it is suggested that mis-use 
of a purely contractual right cannot.  So Teacher v Calder (1899) 1 F (HL) 39, denying a 
claim to a contracting party for the gains made by his co-contractor through breach of the 
contract, is correctly decided as a matter of enrichment law, while the more recent English 
decision of Attorney General v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268 should not be followed (paras 4.30-
4.32).  Breach of fiduciary duties gives rise to claims for wrongfully made profits, but since 
these are not generally part of the law of unjustified enrichment (although there may be 
concurrency of claims in some factual contexts) they are dealt with in an appendix which also 
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covers in critical vein constructive trusts and the “knowing receipt” doctrine apparently 
received from English law by the First Division in Commonwealth Oil & Gas Co Ltd v 
Baxter 2010 SC 156.  Obligations of relief and indemnity are also not, despite contrary 
judicial statements, to be explained as an aspect of unjustified enrichment (paras 2.60-2.66).  
Critical to their exclusion, and that of fiduciary obligations, is the absence of the general  
enrichment defence of change of position.   
 
 Ten years ago I welcomed the first volume in this project as reaching half-way 
towards a redefinition of Scots law in its subject area.
3
  Now that the project is complete, it 
may surely be more than possible for practitioners and the courts to see the law, as it were, 
whole, and to locate whatever the instant issue may be within that overall framework.  With 
the reinforcements soon to be provided by Niall Whitty also coming to hand, the way should 
be fully open for judicial acceptance that the enrichment revolution which the courts initiated 
in the 1990s has indeed been completed by the jurists.  Robin Evans-Jones deserves our 
thanks and plaudits for the superb completion of a task for which the Augean stable metaphor 
is particularly apt.  A river of juristic analysis of the highest quality has swept away the 
remaining detritus of the three Rs.  We should now be in a position to move the law forward 
on its new footings with confidence and certainty. 
 
Hector MacQueen 
Scottish Law Commission  
 
 
                                                 
3
 Book review, 2004 SLT (News) 118-120.  
